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Iran Is Hunting Internet-Facing PLCs. Is Your Base’s Water Plant on the List?

Iran Is Hunting Internet-Facing PLCs. Is Your Base’s Water Plant on the List?
Cyber Plcs

Department of War | OT & Control Systems Cybersecurity

Iran-affiliated actors are hunting internet-facing PLCs. Lock down your base controllers before they do.

In April and July 2026, seven U.S. federal agencies and commands warned that Iranian-affiliated cyber actors are actively exploiting internet-facing programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and cellular modems across water, energy, and government facilities. Military installations run on those exact same controllers. Here is how installation engineers, communications squadrons, and integrators take base PLCs off the internet, segment OT networks under UFC 4-010-06, and protect known-good logic.

  1. 01

    Find

    Inventory every PLC, HMI, and cellular modem reachable from outside the fence

  2. 02

    Gate

    Sever direct internet links and broker remote access via FIPS 140-3 gateways

  3. 03

    Separate

    Isolate facility control VLANs from base business IT under UFC 4-010-06

  4. 04

    Lock & Recover

    Enforce physical RUN mode, eliminate default passwords, and vault offline logic

AA26-097AJoint cybersecurity advisory on Iran-affiliated actors exploiting internet-facing PLCsIssued April 7, 2026; expanded July 22, 2026
3 PLC linesRockwell Automation, Schneider Electric, and Siemens controllers named in the July updatePlus cellular modems exposed on port 22 SSH
105Operational Technology (OT) Zero Trust activities established by the Department of War84 Target Level & 21 Advanced Level controls
Sep 30, 2027Department of War Target-Level Zero Trust deadline across enterprise IT and base OTAligned with FORTRESS America Pillar 4

Published by

Paragon Micro · Public Sector Division

Written for

Installation civil engineers, base communications squadrons, FRCS owners, ISSMs, and FSIs

Research current as of

October 31, 2026 · 16 annotated references

Bottom line up front (BLUF)

  • Seven federal agencies issued an urgent OT warning: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-097A (published April 7, 2026 and expanded July 22, 2026) warns that Iranian-affiliated cyber actors are actively scanning for and compromising internet-facing programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and cellular modems across water, energy, and government facilities.
  • Attackers use legitimate engineering software to disable safety logic: Rather than deploying exotic zero-day malware, actors connect from leased third-party hosting using the PLC vendor's native configuration software—altering HMI/SCADA displays, modifying reusable logic blocks, and disabling automated shutdown and alarm logic.
  • Military bases run on the exact same controllers: Under UFC 4-010-06, base water/wastewater plants, microgrid switchgear, HVAC chillers, fuel pumps, and gate access panels are classified as Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS).
  • Enforce 2026–2027 Zero Trust and cryptographic gates: Taking PLCs off the public internet, closing cellular modem backdoors with FIPS 140-3 validated tunnels, segmenting OT VLANs from enterprise IT, and vaulting offline ladder-logic backups directly advance FORTRESS America and the September 30, 2027 DoW OT Zero Trust mandate.

Chapter 01 | The threat advisory

What the April 2026 PLC advisory and its July update exposed

On April 7, 2026, the FBI, CISA, the NSA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF) issued Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-097A—warning that cyber actors affiliated with Iran were actively exploiting internet-facing programmable logic controllers across U.S. critical infrastructure.

The initial April advisory identified compromises involving Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850 controllers—while cautioning that other industrial manufacturers, including Siemens S7 series devices, were also at risk. Confirmed victims spanned municipal government facilities, water and wastewater treatment plants, and energy sector operations.

Notably, the intruders did not need complex exploit chains to manipulate physical equipment. Routing traffic through overseas IP addresses and leased commercial virtual private servers (VPS), the actors scanned the public internet for exposed industrial ports and connected using the vendor's own legitimate engineering and configuration software. Because the controllers lacked network-level authentication or strong access controls, the PLCs accepted the connections as valid engineering sessions. Once inside, the actors maliciously interacted with controller project files, falsified telemetry displayed on Human-Machine Interface (HMI) and SCADA operator screens, and caused physical operational disruption and financial loss.

How the July 22, 2026 update widened the scope

On July 22, 2026, the Department of the Treasury joined the original six agencies and commands to publish an expanded update to AA26-097A, documenting broader vendor targeting and more dangerous manipulation techniques:

Expanded PLC targets

Schneider Electric & Siemens

The July update added Schneider Electric BMX P34 and Modicon M340 controllers alongside Siemens S7-1200 PLCs to the targeted Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley devices—emphasizing that actors target exposure rather than a single vendor.

Hidden entry vectors

Exposed cellular modems

Investigators documented actors compromising industrial cellular modems attached to remote controllers for vendor telemetry or maintenance—including an exposed SSH server running on port 22.

Sabotage of safety loops

Disabled shutdown & alarm logic

Beyond spoofing HMI displays, the updated advisory warned that actors modified reusable ladder-logic blocks and actively disabled automated equipment shutdown and alarm logic to mask physical damage.

Multi-agency response

Seven federal coauthors

The addition of the Department of the Treasury alongside FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE, and USCYBERCOM CNMF underscored the national-security priority of locking down exposed OT endpoints.

This 2026 campaign builds directly on a playbook first observed in late 2023. In Joint Advisory AA23-335A (issued December 2023), the FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, and Israel's National Cyber Directorate warned that beginning November 22, 2023, cyber actors affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) compromised multiple U.S. water and wastewater facilities by targeting Unitronics Vision Series PLCs left publicly exposed to the internet with factory-default passwords.

The commander & civil engineer's question

Could someone outside the perimeter fence reach any controller that runs your installation’s water, microgrid power, chillers, or entry gates?

If your civil engineering and communications teams cannot verify the answer with a live asset inventory today, Joint Advisory AA26-097A says to start there immediately.

Chapter 02 | The installation risk

Military bases run on the exact same controllers named in the advisory

Every domestic military installation is an industrial city wrapped inside a perimeter fence. Lift stations, potable water treatment plants, substation relays, backup diesel generators, data center chilled-water HVAC loops, aviation fuel farms, and automated vehicle barriers all rely on programmable logic controllers from Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and similar OEMs.

Unified Facilities Criteria UFC 4-010-06 (Cybersecurity of Facility-Related Control Systems, dated October 10, 2023) governs these exact assets across the Department of War, grouping them into four regulated categories:

  1. 01 · Utility Control Systems

    Microgrid controllers, electrical substations, backup generators, water treatment, and wastewater lift stations

    Operational impact: Compromised PLCs can trip base power transfers or disable water treatment alarms during a grid cut.

  2. 02 · Building Control Systems

    Chilled-water plants, CRAC/CRAH server room air handlers, and HVAC building automation

    Operational impact: Disabling cooling logic forces mission servers and C2 nodes into thermal shutdown within minutes.

  3. 03 · Electronic Security Systems

    Perimeter IP cameras, intrusion detection sensors, automated gate bollards, and physical access control panels

    Operational impact: Altered logic or spoofed displays blind security forces at entry control points and flight lines.

  4. 04 · Fire & Life Safety Systems

    Fire suppression controllers, hangar deluge valves, and mass-notification alarm panels

    Operational impact: Tampering with safety logic threatens personnel, aircraft hangars, and munitions storage.

Department of War engineering criteria already prohibit the exact exposures exploited in AA26-097A. Section 4-1.1 of UFC 4-010-06 directs installation engineers to "Avoid dependence on the network for the execution of control strategies," and mandates that "When dependence on the network is unavoidable, isolate that portion of the network as much as possible." Even more explicitly, Section 4-4 is titled "Do Not Provide Remote Access." Yet in practice, unauthorized cellular modems and temporary broadband drops are frequently attached to base lift stations, chillers, or generator skids by maintenance contractors seeking convenient remote diagnostics—creating invisible backdoors that bypass base firewalls entirely.

Closing those backdoors is now a top-tier departmental mandate across three converging initiatives:

  • DoW Operational Technology (OT) Zero Trust Guidance (November 2025): Establishes 105 discrete Zero Trust activities tailored specifically for operational technology and control systems—comprising 84 Target-Level activities and 21 Advanced-Level activities ahead of the department's September 30, 2027 Target-Level Zero Trust deadline.
  • FORTRESS America (Established September 30, 2026): Secretary of War Pete Hegseth's FORTRESS America directive—whose Program Office stood up on October 30, 2026—makes Installation Hardening and Cyber Resilience (Pillar 4) and Energy Independence (Pillar 1) core departmental priorities so bases "cannot be starved out, shut down, or cut off."
  • Two-Front Threat Reality (Iranian PLC Exploitation + Volt Typhoon): While Iranian-affiliated actors scan the public internet and cellular networks for exposed PLCs ("front-door" attacks), joint CISA/NSA/FBI advisories warn that PRC state-sponsored Volt Typhoon actors held footholds inside victim IT networks for at least five years to pivot laterally into OT control enclaves and camera systems ("side-door" attacks). Defending a base requires sealing both paths simultaneously.

Chapter 03 | The seven-step protocol

PLC cybersecurity on a military installation, step by step

The seven engineering actions below translate the mitigations in Joint Advisory AA26-097A and its July 2026 update directly into an actionable checklist for installation civil engineers, communications squadrons, and facility integrators:

Hardening step What installation teams & integrators must do Operational & compliance driver
01. Discover every controller & modem Conduct a physical and passive-network inventory of every PLC, HMI operator panel, RTU, and cellular modem across base water, power, HVAC, fuel, and gate systems; scan externally to verify none resolve to a public IP. Actors in AA26-097A located victims via automated internet-wide scanning for exposed industrial ports.
02. Sever direct internet connections Disconnect all PLCs and HMIs from the public internet immediately. Where remote maintenance is formally authorized, broker sessions exclusively through a hardened jump host or Zero Trust gateway with phishing-resistant MFA. First immediate mitigation in AA26-097A and mandatory under UFC 4-010-06 Section 4-4 (Do Not Provide Remote Access).
03. Enforce strict IP & protocol allowlists Configure industrial firewalls and access control lists (ACLs) so each PLC accepts engineering and Modbus/EtherNet/IP/S7comm traffic only from designated local HMI and historian IP addresses; block commercial VPS and hosting ranges. Intruders initiated legitimate-looking vendor software sessions from leased third-party commercial hosting providers.
04. Close the cellular modem side door Audit remote pump stations, solar arrays, and substations for contractor-installed cellular modems. Disable exposed management services (such as port 22 SSH), transition to private 5G or APN networks, and wrap traffic in FIPS 140-3 validated VPN/ZTNA tunnels. The July 22, 2026 update highlighted compromised cellular modems, and NIST retired FIPS 140-2 to its Historical List on September 21, 2026.
05. Lock physical keyswitches & credentials Turn physical PLC mode keyswitches from REM (Remote) or PROG (Program) to hard RUN mode, enable controller-level programming protection, and replace every factory-default password across PLCs, HMIs, and modems. Physical RUN mode blocks remote logic downloads over the network; default passwords enabled the AA23-335A Unitronics breaches.
06. Vault offline known-good logic Maintain immutable, offline gold copies of every controller's ladder logic, reusable function blocks, and HMI project files. Periodically diff running controller logic against the offline baseline and verify backups before restoring. The July 2026 update warned that actors altered reusable logic blocks and disabled automated shutdown and alarm routines.
07. Brief & govern base contractors Notify every utility, HVAC, and physical security maintenance contractor of the active threat, prohibit unauthorized cellular drop-boxes in contract language, and verify contractor CMMC Phase 1 Level 2 self-assessments and NIST SP 800-171 compliance for CUI facility files. AA26-097A explicitly directs facility owners to alert third-party integrators and service providers with OT access.

The golden rule of installation OT security

A programmable logic controller should be reachable only by the local sensors, actuators, and operator panels that run that physical process. Every other network path to a PLC is a path for an adversary.

Chapter 04 | Network separation & recovery

Close the side doors: separate control enclaves from the base network

Pulling PLCs and cellular modems off the public internet slams the front door shut against opportunistic scanning. However, as the joint Volt Typhoon advisories demonstrated, sophisticated state-sponsored actors also break in through the side door—compromising an everyday enterprise IT workstation or email account, harvesting credentials for years, and pivoting across flat campus networks into utility and camera enclaves.

A compromised office laptop, morale Wi-Fi access point, or unsegmented perimeter camera should never have a routable Layer 3 path to the programmable logic controller governing the base water plant or microgrid switchgear. Implementing defense-in-depth under UFC 4-010-06 and the Department of War's 105 OT Zero Trust activities requires four architectural controls:

01 · Enclave isolation

Dedicated OT VLANs & zones

Place each facility control system—water, electrical microgrid, HVAC chillers, and electronic security—inside its own isolated network zone using managedスイッチ hardware (such as Dell PowerSwitch) with strict port-level 802.1X authentication and MAC locking.

02 · Brokered conduits

Monitored crossing points

Eliminate direct routing between business IT and OT enclaves. Where telemetry must cross into enterprise dashboards, enforce unidirectional data diodes or next-generation industrial firewalls that inspect and log every packet at the boundary.

03 · Local survivorship

Islanded control execution

In accordance with UFC 4-010-06 Section 4-1.1, ensure local PLCs, microgrid relays, badge readers, and NVR camera recorders continue executing their safety and control loops locally even if the base backbone fiber is severed.

04 · Air-gapped vaulting

Immutable logic & config recovery

Store offline, cryptographically verified copies of all PLC project files, firmware baselines, switch configurations, and access-control databases inside an air-gapped vault (such as Dell PowerProtect Cyber Recovery) so tampered controllers can be bare-metal restored in hours.

Chapter 05 | How we help

Where Dell Technologies Federal and Paragon Micro’s Public Sector Division fit

Dell Technologies Federal Platinum Partner badge

Paragon Micro, through its Public Sector Division, is a Dell Technologies Federal Platinum Partner and AS9120-certified multi-vendor integrator. We help installation civil engineers, communications squadrons, and prime integrators design, source, pre-stage, and sustain the network segmentation, identity access controls, private wireless, and air-gapped recovery infrastructure that keep base control systems off the internet and isolated from lateral threats.

Paragon Micro System Readiness Center showing the secure facility exterior, staging floor, pallets of hardware, and loading dock

System Readiness Center

From secure facility to deployment readiness

55,000+ sq ftAS9120 certifiedNIST SP 800-171

Paragon Micro's 55,000+ sq. ft., AS9120-certified System Readiness Center—where base control network switches, rugged edge servers, and cyber recovery vaults are pre-staged, hardened, and burn-in tested by vetted U.S. citizens before arriving at the installation.

Microsegmentation

Networks that stop lateral movement

We architect Zero Trust and Cyber Resilience enclaves using Dell PowerSwitch, rugged edge compute, and multi-OEM industrial firewalls—isolating utility and building control VLANs and mapping every control to your RMF / ATO package.

Secure remote access & 5G

Replace exposed cellular modems

We replace vulnerable public cellular drop-boxes with hardened, FIPS 140-3 validated ZTNA jump hosts and on-base Dell Federal 5G private wireless infrastructure running on rugged PowerEdge XR8000 servers.

Proven base past performance

Keesler Air Force Base modernization

At Keesler Air Force Base, Paragon Micro modernized the installation's electronic security architecture—deploying 732 IP cameras across entry gates, the flight line, the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC), and the Command Post through the DoWIN Approved Products List (APL) process with complete as-built network diagrams.

Air-gapped logic recovery

PowerProtect Cyber Recovery vaults

We design and stage immutable backup vaults with independent credentials and management planes so civil engineers always have a clean, offline copy of PLC ladder logic, SCADA databases, and switch configurations.

End-to-end execution for installation teams

If your civil engineering or base communications squadron lacks the bandwidth to untangle legacy control networks from the campus LAN, Paragon Micro's Public Sector division executes the full lifecycle with your team:

  1. 01

    Architect & source

    Size and procure the TAA- and Section 889-compliant switches, firewalls, rugged servers, UPS banks, and recovery vaults that split each control network from the base LAN.

  2. 02

    Pre-stage & integrate

    Rack, cable, load golden configs, and burn-in test the complete enclave in our System Readiness Center before installing and cutting over on base with minimal downtime.

  3. 03

    Train base operators

    Train your civil engineering technicians and network administrators on the new enclave boundaries, brokered gateway workflows, and offline logic backup procedures.

  4. 04

    Sustain & refresh

    Provide ongoing lifecycle sustainment, as-built ATO documentation, bonded spare hardware, and firmware/patch baseline management across the deployment.

Paragon Micro · Public Sector Division | Dell Technologies Federal

Take your installation’s controllers off the internet.

Share your installation's current control-system topology and remote-access requirements with our defense engineering team. We will help you design the UFC 4-010-06 segmentation, the FIPS 140-3 remote-access gateway, and the offline logic recovery vault—then pre-stage and test the complete build inside our System Readiness Center before it ships to your base.

U.S. Army installations and federal agencies can order rapidly through Army ITES-4H (ordering through 2035). The Missile Defense Agency and Department of War organizations can procure through the $151B MDA SHIELD IDIQ (HQ0859-26-D-E455), and all federal buyers can leverage NASA SEWP V, NASA SEWP VI (80TECH26D2050), and GSA MAS.

Answers for installation teams

PLC cybersecurity: common questions

What is PLC cybersecurity on a military installation?

PLC cybersecurity protects programmable logic controllers—the ruggedized industrial computers that operate base water treatment plants, electrical microgrid switchgear, backup generators, HVAC chillers, fuel farms, and automated entry gates—from unauthorized network access and logic tampering. Core controls include disconnecting PLCs from the public internet and cellular networks, isolating OT subnets from enterprise business IT under UFC 4-010-06, locking physical mode switches to RUN, replacing default passwords, and maintaining offline backups of known-good ladder logic.

What did Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-097A and its July 2026 update warn about?

Issued on April 7, 2026 by the FBI, CISA, NSA, EPA, DOE, and U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber National Mission Force—and expanded on July 22, 2026 with the Department of the Treasury—Advisory AA26-097A warned that Iranian-affiliated cyber actors are actively scanning for and exploiting internet-facing PLCs and industrial cellular modems across U.S. water, energy, and government facilities. Attackers used legitimate vendor configuration software from leased third-party hosting to falsify HMI/SCADA displays, alter reusable logic blocks, and disable automated shutdown and alarm routines.

Which specific PLC brands and devices were named in the 2026 advisories?

The April 7, 2026 advisory named Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850 controllers. The July 22, 2026 update expanded the list to include Schneider Electric BMX P34 and Modicon M340 controllers, Siemens S7-1200 controllers, and industrial cellular modems (including a compromise via an exposed SSH server on port 22), while emphasizing that any internet-facing controller brand is at risk.

How do UFC 4-010-06 and the DoW OT Zero Trust guidance apply to base PLCs?

Unified Facilities Criteria UFC 4-010-06 (Cybersecurity of Facility-Related Control Systems) governs building control, utility control, electronic security, and fire/life safety systems on military bases. Section 4-1.1 requires minimizing network dependency and isolating control networks, while Section 4-4 explicitly directs installations not to provide remote access. Complementing UFC 4-010-06, the Department of War's November 2025 Operational Technology Zero Trust guidance establishes 105 OT security activities (84 Target Level and 21 Advanced Level) ahead of the September 30, 2027 Target-Level Zero Trust deadline.

What is the very first step an installation should take today?

Conduct an immediate inventory of every PLC, operator HMI panel, and cellular modem across base water, power, HVAC, and gate systems to identify any device reachable from the public internet or an unsegmented cellular carrier network—then sever those direct connections and broker any essential remote maintenance through a hardened, FIPS 140-3 validated jump host or ZTNA gateway.

How does Paragon Micro’s Public Sector division help secure base control networks?

As a Dell Technologies Federal Platinum Partner and AS9120-certified multi-vendor integrator, Paragon Micro's Public Sector division designs UFC 4-010-06 network segmentation, FIPS 140-3 identity and access gateways, private 5G alternatives to exposed cellular modems, and air-gapped PowerProtect logic recovery vaults. We pre-stage and test complete enclaves inside our 55,000+ sq. ft. System Readiness Center and have delivered complex base security modernizations such as the 732-camera DoWIN APL deployment at Keesler Air Force Base.

Timeline

Key dates through 2027

  1. Nov 22, 2023

    IRGC-affiliated actors begin exploiting internet-facing Unitronics PLCs with default passwords

    Joint Advisory AA23-335A

  2. Nov 2025

    Department of War releases Operational Technology (OT) Zero Trust implementation guidance

    105 OT activities (84 Target / 21 Advanced)

  3. Apr 7, 2026

    Six federal agencies and commands issue Joint Advisory AA26-097A on PLC exploitation

    Names Rockwell / Allen-Bradley PLCs

  4. Jul 13, 2026

    DoW suspends CMMC Phase 2 third-party mandates; Phase 1 Level 2 self-assessments continue

    NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 remains mandatory

  5. Jul 22, 2026

    Seven-agency update to AA26-097A adds Schneider Electric, Siemens, and cellular modems

    Warns of disabled shutdown & alarm logic

  6. Sep 21, 2026

    NIST moves FIPS 140-2 to Historical List; specify FIPS 140-3 on new CUI gateways

    CMVP cryptographic transition

  7. Oct 30, 2026

    FORTRESS America Program Office 30-day stand-up deadline under USW(A&S)

    Synchronizes base energy & cyber hardening

  8. Sep 30, 2027

    Department of War Target-Level Zero Trust deadline across enterprise IT and base OT

    End of FY2027 mandate

  9. Dec 23, 2027

    NDAA Section 5949 prohibition on SMIC, YMTC, and CXMT semiconductors takes effect

    Applies across COTS IT & OT hardware

Related reading

Research library Sources and chapter annotations (16 references) Expand to view all APA 7th edition references annotated by the article chapters they support

Research reviewed October 31, 2026 by Paragon Micro (Public Sector Division). All in-text parenthetical citations have been consolidated into this expandable reference library and mapped to the exact chapters and timelines they support. Joint cybersecurity advisories are updated as investigations continue; verify the latest revision on CISA/IC3 before executing remediation plans.

  1. Cited in BLUF, Chapters 2, 3, 4 & FAQ · UFC 4-010-06 Control Systems Cybersecurity Criteria

    Department of Defense. (2023, October 10). Cybersecurity of facility-related control systems (UFC 4-010-06). Whole Building Design Guide. https://www.wbdg.org/FFC/DOD/UFC/ufc_4_010_06_2023.pdf

    Supports the definition of Facility-Related Control Systems (building, utility, electronic security, and fire/life safety), Section 4-1.1 (avoiding network dependency and isolating control segments), and Section 4-4 (Do Not Provide Remote Access) in BLUF, Chapters 2, 3, and 4, and the FAQ.

  2. Cited in Hero Stats, Chapter 2, FAQ & Timeline · DoW Operational Technology Zero Trust Guidance

    Easley, M. (2025, December 1). Pentagon posts guidance on implementing zero trust for operational technology. DefenseScoop. https://defensescoop.com/2025/12/01/dod-guidance-implementing-zero-trust-for-operational-technology-ot/

    Supports the November 2025 Department of War OT Zero Trust guidance establishing 105 activities (84 Target Level and 21 Advanced Level) ahead of the September 30, 2027 deadline in the Hero stats, Chapter 2, the FAQ, and the Timeline.

  3. Cited in Chapters 1, 3 & Timeline · November 2023 IRGC Unitronics PLC Campaign (AA23-335A)

    Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Security Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, & Israel National Cyber Directorate. (2023, December 1; updated 2023, December 14). IRGC-affiliated cyber actors exploit PLCs in multiple sectors, including U.S. water and wastewater systems facilities (AA23-335A). https://media.defense.gov/2023/Dec/04/2003350920/-1/-1/0/CSA-IRGC-AFFILIATED-CYBER-ACTORS-EXPLOIT-PLCS-IN-MULTIPLE-SECTORS.PDF

    Supports the November 22, 2023 campaign in which IRGC-affiliated actors compromised U.S. water facilities via internet-exposed Unitronics PLCs left on default passwords in Chapters 1 and 3 and the Timeline.

  4. Cited in Hero Stats, BLUF, Chapters 1, 3, FAQ & Timeline · April 7, 2026 Joint PLC Advisory (AA26-097A)

    Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Security Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, & U.S. Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force. (2026a, April 7). Iranian-affiliated cyber actors exploit programmable logic controllers across US critical infrastructure (AA26-097A). https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260407.pdf

    Primary source supporting the April 7, 2026 six-agency warning on Iranian-affiliated exploitation of Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850 controllers, use of native vendor configuration software from leased hosting, and HMI/SCADA manipulation across all sections.

  5. Cited in Hero Stats, BLUF, Chapters 1, 3, FAQ & Timeline · July 22, 2026 Expanded PLC Advisory (AA26-097A Update)

    Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Security Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, U.S. Cyber Command Cyber National Mission Force, & Department of the Treasury. (2026b, July 22). Iranian-affiliated cyber actors exploit programmable logic controllers across US critical infrastructure (AA26-097A, updated). https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260722.pdf

    Primary source supporting the July 22, 2026 seven-agency update adding the Department of the Treasury, Schneider Electric BMX P34 and Modicon M340 PLCs, Siemens S7-1200 PLCs, compromised cellular modems (including port 22 SSH exposure), and disabled shutdown/alarm logic across all sections.

  6. Cited in Chapters 2 & 4 · Volt Typhoon IT-to-OT Pre-Positioning

    Greig, J. (2024, February 7). CISA, FBI warn of China-linked hackers pre-positioning for 'destructive cyberattacks against US critical infrastructure.' The Record. https://therecord.media/cisa-fbi-warn-of-china-linked-hackers-targeting-critical-us-infrastructure

    Supports the analysis in Chapters 2 and 4 contrasting "front-door" internet-facing PLC exploitation with Volt Typhoon's 5-year "side-door" lateral movement from enterprise IT into OT and facility camera networks.

  7. Cited in BLUF, Chapter 3 & Timeline · FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Transition

    National Institute of Standards and Technology. (n.d.). Cryptographic Module Validation Program. Retrieved October 31, 2026, from https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program

    Supports the September 21, 2026 transition of FIPS 140-2 certificates to NIST's Historical List and the requirement for FIPS 140-3 validated encryption on remote-access gateways and cellular VPN tunnels in BLUF, Chapter 3, and the Timeline.

  8. Cited in Chapter 5 · Dell Technologies Federal Platinum Partnership

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-a). Dell Federal. https://www.paragonmicro.us/partners/dell-federal/

    Supports Paragon Micro's status as a Dell Technologies Federal Platinum Partner in Chapter 5.

  9. Cited in Chapter 5 & FAQ · Keesler Air Force Base 732-Camera Modernization

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-b). Keesler Air Force Base video surveillance modernization. https://www.paragonmicro.us/past-performance/keesler-air-force-base-video-surveillance-modernization/

    Supports Paragon Micro's past performance modernizing 732 IP cameras across entry gates, the flight line, the BDOC, and the Command Post at Keesler AFB through the DoWIN APL process in Chapter 5 and the FAQ.

  10. Cited in Chapter 5 & FAQ · System Readiness Center & AS9120 Staging

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-c). Secure integration & staging facility [alongside June 30, 2026 AS9120 certification]. https://www.paragonmicro.us/about-us/facility/

    Supports Paragon Micro's 55,000+ sq. ft., AS9120-certified System Readiness Center capabilities and pre-deployment staging in Chapter 5 and the FAQ.

  11. Cited in Chapter 5 · Electronic Security & Physical Access Control

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-d). Video surveillance & physical security. https://www.paragonmicro.us/solutions/video-surveillance-and-physical-security/

    Supports Paragon Micro's physical security camera and access-control integration capabilities in Chapter 5.

  12. Cited in Chapter 5 · Zero Trust Microsegmentation & ATO Support

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-e). Zero trust & cyber resilience for government. https://www.paragonmicro.us/solutions/zero-trust-and-cyber-resilience/

    Supports Paragon Micro's Zero Trust microsegmentation, identity/MFA, and ATO documentation services in Chapter 5.

  13. Cited in Chapters 4 & 5 · Dell Federal Guide (Chapters 10, 15 & 18)

    Paragon Micro. (2026a). Dell Federal and Paragon Micro: How the partnership is positioned for FORTRESS America, Project Meridian, and the Autonomous Warfare Command. https://www.paragonmicro.us/dell-federal-paragon-micro-dow-initiatives/

    Supports the Dell PowerSwitch segmentation, Dell Federal 5G, and PowerProtect Cyber Recovery vault architectures in Chapters 4 and 5.

  14. Cited in BLUF, Chapters 2, 5 & Timeline · FORTRESS America Installation Resilience

    Paragon Micro. (2026b, October 2). FORTRESS America: What independent bases need from their IT and security systems [referencing Secretary Hegseth's September 30, 2026 establishing memorandum]. https://www.paragonmicro.us/fortress-america-installation-it-security/

    Supports the FORTRESS America five-pillar framework and the October 30, 2026 Program Office stand-up milestone in BLUF, Chapters 2 and 5, and the Timeline.

  15. Cited in Chapter 3 & Timeline · CMMC Phase 2 Suspension & Phase 1 Enforcement

    U.S. Department of War. (2026, July 13). Forging the arsenal of freedom: Department of War suspends CMMC Phase II requirements [Press release]. https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4542329/forging-the-arsenal-of-freedom-department-of-war-suspends-cmmc-phase-ii-require/

    Supports the July 13, 2026 suspension of CMMC Phase 2 third-party mandates and the continued enforcement of Phase 1 Level 2 self-assessments and NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 for contractors handling CUI control-system files in Chapter 3 (Step 7) and the Timeline.

  16. Cited in Chapter 1 · April 2026 PLC Advisory Media Coverage

    Whittaker, Z. (2026, April 7). Iranian hackers are targeting American critical infrastructure, US agencies warn. TechCrunch. https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/07/iranian-hackers-are-targeting-american-critical-infrastructure-u-s-agencies-warn/

    Supports supplementary reporting on the April 7, 2026 multi-agency PLC advisory in Chapter 1.

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