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FORTRESS America: What Independent Bases Need From Their IT and Security Systems

FORTRESS America: What Independent Bases Need From Their IT and Security Systems
Paragon Micro Fortress America 1280x720

Department of War | Installation resilience

Every major installation is set to make its own power. The IT inside has to be ready for it.

FORTRESS America mandates onsite power generation, hardened defense against cyberattacks, sabotage, and drone incursions, and domestic supply-chain independence. Here is what that requires from the servers, control networks, cameras, and sensors that run a military installation.

  1. 01

    Power

    Backup circuits, HVAC cooling, UPS runtime, and microgrid cutovers

  2. 02

    Cyber

    Microgrid controllers, cameras, and access panels as OT control systems

  3. 03

    Drones

    Multi-sensor fusion, resilient networks, and edge compute for C-UAS

  4. 04

    Supply

    Section 5949 chips, rare earth magnets, and pre-staged IT reserves

33Installations that have cut the commercial grid to test backup powerMIT Lincoln Laboratory readiness exercises
420Approximate drone sightings over DoW installations in the year ending September 2025Up 82% year-over-year (NORTHCOM)
5 yearsMinimum dwell time Volt Typhoon held inside some victim IT networksJoint CISA, NSA, and FBI advisory
Sep 30, 2028Target deadline to operate an Army-regulated reactor at a domestic baseExecutive Order 14299 mandate

Published by

Paragon Micro · Public Sector Division

Written for

Federal System Integrators, DoW installation offices, and advanced projects teams

Research current as of

October 31, 2026 · About 15 min read

Research library

39 annotated references by chapter

On September 30, 2026, at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced FORTRESS America—short for Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy, Supply and Survivability. The directive mandates that major U.S. military installations generate their own power independent of the civilian utility grid, repatriates domestic production of rare earths, specialty metals, semiconductors, and propellants, expands strategic stockpiles of munitions, fuel, medicine, and blood, and hardens domestic bases against cyberattacks, physical sabotage, and drone incursions. A formal memorandum signed the same day established FORTRESS America as an official Department of War program.

"If an adversary takes down the grid by cyber attack, by sabotage, or by any means, our bases stay lit, our aircraft keep flying, our command centers never go dark," Hegseth stated during the announcement. His directive gave the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment 30 days—through October 30, 2026—to stand up the FORTRESS America Program Office, led by a Senior Executive Service (SES) director supported by a two-star military advisor, transitioning from an initial lean core cell to full operating capability over the coming months while long-term budget allocations and permanent billets are finalized.

FORTRESS America was unveiled alongside Project Meridian and the Autonomous Warfare Command (AutoWarCom). Every one of its operational mandates runs directly through installation IT and operational technology (OT): the servers and storage arrays inside the base data center, the fiber and wireless networks carrying perimeter video and counter-UAS sensor feeds, the programmable logic controllers governing the base microgrid, and the verified provenance of every chip and sub-component inside them.

Key takeaways

  • Five synchronized pillars: The September 30, 2026 establishing memorandum structures FORTRESS America around energy independence, supply-chain and defense industrial base resilience, a strategic defense reserve, installation hardening and cyber resilience, and space and spectrum resilience—managed by a dedicated program office stood up at the end of October 2026.
  • Backup power fails if cooling and switches are left off the circuit: Black-start grid-cut exercises across 33 installations exposed degraded UPS batteries, unserviced generators, and server room HVAC left off emergency backup circuits—causing mission servers to thermally shut down even when rack power stayed up.
  • Cameras, badge readers, and microgrid controllers are regulated OT: Under UFC 4-010-06, physical security cameras, access control panels, and utility controllers are classified as Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS). Joint intelligence advisories warn that state-sponsored Volt Typhoon actors held footholds in victim IT networks for at least 5 years to pivot into OT and camera systems.
  • Base counter-UAS is an edge compute and network integration problem: Drone sightings over U.S. military installations jumped 82% to roughly 420 incidents in the year ending September 2025, including coordinated waves of 12 to 15 drones over Barksdale Air Force Base in March 2026. Defeating them requires fusing radar, RF, acoustic, and optical feeds into a single low-latency display.
  • Understand the 2027 magnet vs. semiconductor rules: While the January 1, 2027 DFARS 252.225-7052 rare-earth magnet expansion generally exempts COTS electronic devices unless overridden by contract, the December 23, 2027 NDAA Section 5949 prohibition on SMIC, YMTC, and CXMT semiconductors reaches directly into commercial IT servers, switches, and cameras.

Chapter 1

What FORTRESS America covers

Secretary Hegseth anchored the initiative around two foundational commitments. On installation energy: "Every major military installation in America is going to generate its own power. Independent of the civilian grid." On industrial sovereignty: "We are bringing our critical supply chains home. The rare earths, the specialty metals, the semiconductors, the propellants."

Memorandum from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, dated September 30, 2026, establishing FORTRESS America as a Department of War program for the defense of the American homeland
Primary source: Secretary of War memorandum, Establishment of FORTRESS America as a Department of War Program for the Defense of the American Homeland, dated September 30, 2026.

Primary directive

The directive that created FORTRESS America

Issued on September 30, 2026 to senior Pentagon leadership, combatant commanders, and defense agency directors, the memorandum formally establishes FORTRESS America as a Department of War program dedicated to homeland installation defense and operational continuity.

Program office
Directed the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment to stand up the program office within 30 days (October 30, 2026).
Leadership
Managed day-to-day by a Senior Executive Service (SES) official paired with a two-star general or flag officer advisor.
Operational ramp
Activates as an agile core cell and scales to full operating capability within months.
Department-wide scope
Requires active execution support across all military departments, combatant commands, and defense field activities.

“A homeland that cannot be starved out, shut down, or cut off.”

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Establishing Memorandum

Read the full memo

The five operational pillars of FORTRESS America

The establishing directive organizes FORTRESS America around five mutually reinforcing pillars designed to synchronize infrastructure upgrades across every major domestic installation. Each row below maps the strategic mandate to the specific IT and security engineering requirements covered in this guide.

  1. 1

    Energy independence

    Installations generate their own baseload power independent of civilian utility grids—incorporating Air Force nuclear microreactors (such as Eielson AFB in Alaska), Army regulated and commercial microreactors, solar, geothermal, and hardened microgrid distribution.

    Covered inChapter 2: Power

  2. 2

    Supply chain and defense industrial base resilience

    Onshoring and friend-shoring critical raw materials and sub-components—including rare earth permanent magnets, specialty metals, trusted semiconductors, and energetics.

    Covered inChapter 5: Supply chain

  3. 3

    Strategic defense reserve

    Building deep domestic stockpiles of munitions, fuel, pharmaceuticals, blood, and pre-configured mission-critical repair parts to weather prolonged supply disruptions.

    Covered inChapter 5: IT reserves

  4. 4

    Installation hardening and cyber resilience

    Defending base facilities, operational technology (OT) control networks, and flight lines against state-sponsored cyber pre-positioning, physical sabotage, and multi-drone incursions.

    Covered inChapter 3: Cyber
    Chapter 4: Drones

  5. 5

    Resilience in space and spectrum

    Ensuring satellite communications terminals, base tactical radios, and electromagnetic spectrum operations remain online when primary commercial power and fiber trunks are severed.

    Covered inChapter 2: Comms on backup power

In the same Quantico address, Hegseth unveiled plans for the Next Great American Base—a new mega-installation spanning hundreds of thousands of acres engineered from the ground up with independent power generation, autonomous systems ranges, and integrated air and missile defenses to host 15,000 to 25,000 service members. While that flagship installation will build resilience into its blueprint from day one, FORTRESS America requires existing bases across the country to retrofit those same capabilities into live operational environments.

The policy and threat trail behind FORTRESS America

FORTRESS America consolidates more than two years of urgent cyber advisories, executive orders, statutory counter-drone authorities, and base incursion lessons into a single program of record. Each milestone below directly shapes what installation contracting offices and prime integrators must specify.

  1. February 7, 2024

    Joint Volt Typhoon Advisory: CISA, NSA, and FBI warn that Chinese state-sponsored actors held persistent access inside U.S. critical infrastructure IT networks—including on Guam—for at least five years to pre-position for destructive OT attacks and access facility camera systems.

    Impact on buyers: Base utility controllers, SCADA networks, and physical security cameras must be segmented and defended as high-priority cyber targets.

  2. February 13, 2025

    NORTHCOM Base Incursion Testimony: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commander Gen. Gregory Guillot testifies that 350 unauthorized drone detections occurred across 100 U.S. military installations during 2024.

    Impact on buyers: Persistent perimeter counter-UAS sensing shifts from deployed overseas bases to every domestic installation.

  3. May 2025

    Executive Order 14299 (Advanced Nuclear Deployment): Directs the Secretary of the Army to commence operation of an Army-regulated nuclear reactor at a domestic military installation no later than September 30, 2028.

    Impact on buyers: Installation microgrids begin incorporating long-duration nuclear baseload generation alongside diesel and solar.

  4. July 10, 2025

    Pentagon–MP Materials Rare Earth Partnership: The department commits to a $400 million preferred equity stake in MP Materials and a 10-year price floor ($110/kg for NdPr) to scale domestic rare-earth magnet manufacturing to 10,000 metric tons by 2028.

    Impact on buyers: Establishes a domestic supply chain ahead of strict 2027 DFARS magnet origin prohibitions.

  5. August 28, 2025

    Activation of JIATF-401: The Pentagon establishes Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), replacing the prior joint counter-sUAS office and granting authority to approve up to $50 million per counter-drone initiative.

    Impact on buyers: Centralizes rapid counter-drone procurement and base pilot evaluations under one joint task force.

  6. October 14, 2025

    U.S. Army & DOE Janus Program Launch: The Army, Department of Energy, and Defense Innovation Unit launch the Janus program to deploy commercially owned, multi-megawatt microreactors on domestic Army installations.

    Impact on buyers: Introduces commercial power-purchase and microgrid-interconnection architectures onto base property.

  7. December 18, 2025

    FY2026 NDAA & SAFER SKIES Act Enacted: Codifies JIATF-401 into statute, amends 10 U.S.C. § 130i to require annual public reporting of base drone incidents, and expands counter-drone authorities to trained federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.

    Impact on buyers: Installation C-UAS networks must archive high-integrity sensor and video evidence for statutory reporting and interagency coordination.

  8. February 11, 2026

    Executive Order on Base Baseload Power: Directs the Secretary of War to pursue long-term power purchase agreements with coal generation facilities serving military installations.

    Impact on buyers: Expands multi-source generation inputs feeding installation microgrid controllers.

  9. March 9–15, 2026

    Barksdale Air Force Base Swarm Incursions: Security forces at Barksdale AFB track multiple coordinated waves of 12 to 15 drones operating over sensitive flight-line and weapons areas.

    Impact on buyers: Proves installation C-UAS architectures must track simultaneous multi-target waves rather than isolated single quadcopters.

  10. May 6, 2026

    JIATF-401 Directed-Energy Base Pilot: JIATF-401 selects five domestic installations (Fort Huachuca, Fort Bliss, Naval Base Kitsap, Grand Forks AFB, and Whiteman AFB) to pilot high-energy laser and high-power microwave C-UAS effectors.

    Impact on buyers: High-energy effectors introduce massive instantaneous power draws and low-latency sensor-to-shooter networking requirements onto base grids.

  11. September 30, 2026

    FORTRESS America Formally Established: Secretary Hegseth announces FORTRESS America at Quantico and signs the directive ordering the Program Office to stand up within 30 days (October 30, 2026).

    Impact on buyers: Unifies base power, OT cyber hardening, C-UAS, and supply-chain compliance under a single executive program office.

Chapter 2

Power: when the base runs on its own generation

The U.S. Army defines an installation microgrid as a local electrical distribution system "with the controls to manage multiple generation sources and loads" engineered to island and "operate independently from the grid during times of emergency response." At Joint Forces Training Base Los Alamitos, for example, the installation microgrid was architected to sustain critical base missions for at least 14 consecutive days during a civilian utility blackout.

Under FORTRESS America, onsite generation is scaling rapidly beyond legacy diesel backup generators. Executive Order 14299 mandates operation of an Army-regulated nuclear reactor at a domestic installation by September 30, 2028, while the Army's Janus program—in partnership with the Defense Innovation Unit and the Department of Energy—is contracting commercially owned microreactors sited directly on Army installations. Combined with Air Force microreactor pilots at Eielson AFB, solar and geothermal arrays, and long-term coal power purchase agreements directed under the February 2026 executive order, base data centers and network closets will increasingly run on dynamic, multi-source microgrids.

What live grid-cut tests exposed

33

Installations that have executed unannounced or live Energy Resilience Readiness Exercises (ERREs), testing systems serving more than 800,000 personnel

During an Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise (ERRE), an installation physically severs its connection to the commercial utility grid—pulling the main breaker to test how backup power, transfer switches, and facility teams perform under real load. MIT Lincoln Laboratory, which developed the ERRE program, documented four recurring IT and facility failure modes across 33 exercises:

  • UPS battery collapse: Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) banks failed or drained prematurely due to aged cells, deferred maintenance, or delayed generator spin-up.
  • Generator transfer failures: Standby generators failed to assume load because fuel lines, transfer switches, or maintenance schedules had lapsed.
  • Orphaned HVAC cooling circuits: Server room and wiring closet air-conditioning units were wired to normal utility panels rather than emergency backup circuits—causing mission servers to thermally trip and shut down even while rack PDUs still had power.
  • Dark communications closets: Intermediate distribution frames (IDFs), fiber switches, and radio repeaters lacked local battery backup, severing command links the moment utility power dropped.

Congress mandates that each military department conduct at least five ERREs per year—a statutory requirement reauthorized through 2032.

Backup power must support all four layers of the IT stack

Every layer of installation IT depends on the physical layer beneath it. Keeping a server rack on emergency generator power achieves nothing if the room's chilled-water air handler or the upstream campus core switch goes dark.

  1. 01 · Mission systems

    Base data center servers, video management storage, C-UAS sensor fusion nodes, command applications

    Failure mode: Go offline immediately if network transport, room cooling, or clean UPS power drops.

  2. 02 · Network transport

    Campus core/access switches, firewalls, fiber distribution closets, tactical radios, SATCOM terminals

    Failure mode: ERREs repeatedly found communications closets dropped offline for lack of local UPS runtime.

  3. 03 · Environmental cooling

    CRAC/CRAH server room air handlers, in-row cooling, and telecom closet ventilation

    Failure mode: Left off emergency backup circuits, ambient heat forces servers into thermal shutdown within minutes.

  4. 04 · Power & conditioning

    Commercial utility feed, onsite microgrid generation, automatic transfer switches (ATS), double-conversion UPS

    Failure mode: Voltage sags, frequency transients during microgrid islanding, or unserviced UPS batteries.

What to specify for installation IT power resilience

  • Audit every dependent circuit: Map every hardware load required to keep a critical mission online—including wiring closet PoE switches, fiber media converters, CRAC/HVAC cooling units, radio base stations, and NVR camera recorders—and verify that 100% of them sit on emergency backup panels.
  • Specify double-conversion online UPS topologies: When a base transitions from commercial utility power to diesel generators, solar inverters, or microreactors, frequency and voltage fluctuations can reboot sensitive server PSUs. Specify true online double-conversion UPS units sized to bridge the longest transfer window, paired with a funded battery replacement schedule.
  • Meter actual rack power draw under load: Provide civil engineers and microgrid designers with measured peak and sustained kilowatt loads per rack rather than nameplate estimates so onsite generation is sized accurately.
  • Validate graceful auto-restart policies: Configure BIOS power-restore states, storage array boot sequences, and out-of-band management controllers so racks recover automatically in the correct dependency order after a hard power cut.
  • Participate in the base's next ERRE: Insist that installation IT, physical security cameras, and counter-UAS networks are instrumented and evaluated during the base's next live grid-cut exercise.
  • Match remote and tactical power inputs at procurement: For perimeter sensor towers and deployable shelters, specify native AC, -48V DC, 28V vehicle, or solar/lithium-ion battery inputs upfront.

For austere perimeters and deployable base defense nodes, Paragon Micro (through its Public Sector Division) sources and integrates solar, generator, vehicle-power, and high-density lithium-ion power platforms alongside enterprise rack UPS architectures. Every rack system is pre-assembled, wired, load-tested, and burn-in validated inside our System Readiness Center prior to delivery.

Chapter 3

Cyber: the base is a control system network

Every physical capability FORTRESS America relies on—microgrid switchgear, substation relays, perimeter cameras, automated gate bollards, and badge readers—is run by networked computers. Unified Facilities Criteria UFC 4-010-06 (Cybersecurity of Facility-Related Control Systems) establishes mandatory Department of War cybersecurity engineering standards across four categories of Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS): building control systems, utility control systems, electronic security systems (ESS), and fire and life safety systems. That scope directly governs an installation's microgrid controller, video surveillance cameras, and physical access control systems.

UFC 4-010-06 enforces the Risk Management Framework (RMF) down to the field-controller level, requiring engineers to minimize external network dependencies, segment operational technology from general business IT, and design physical control loops that fail gracefully into a safe, locally operable state if network links are severed.

Why installation control systems are primary targets

In February 2024, CISA, the NSA, and the FBI issued a joint cybersecurity advisory warning that People's Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors known as Volt Typhoon had compromised U.S. critical infrastructure networks—including water, energy, communications, and transportation systems in Guam and across the continental United States—to pre-position for disruptive or destructive cyberattacks in the event of a major crisis. Investigators found that Volt Typhoon maintained covert access inside some victim IT environments for at least five years, harvested credentials to pivot from enterprise IT into operational technology (OT) control networks, and in multiple instances accessed facility camera surveillance systems.

Defending these control networks intersects directly with the Department of War's mandate to achieve Target-Level Zero Trust by September 30, 2027. As defense CIO leadership noted when establishing the implementation roadmap, extending Zero Trust controls beyond standard enterprise IT enclaves into weapon systems, operational technology, and SCADA/FRCS environments represents a major engineering lift—and installation microgrids and security enclaves sit squarely at that boundary.

What to specify for control system & physical security cyber hardening

  • Enforce strict IT/OT microsegmentation: Isolate microgrid controllers, HVAC building management, IP cameras, and access control panels on dedicated, air-gapped or firewall-segmented VLANs with monitored, unidirectional or zero-trust brokered crossing points.
  • Maintain a continuous hardware and firmware asset inventory: Log the exact make, model, MAC address, and firmware build of every programmable logic controller (PLC), IP camera, and door controller on the installation.
  • Harden endpoints before cutover: Eliminate factory-default credentials, disable unused management ports (Telnet, unencrypted HTTP, UPnP), and enforce certificate-based 802.1X port authentication before any device touches the base network.
  • Inspect east-west traffic inside the control enclave: Deploy passive OT network visibility and anomaly detection between controllers and switches—where living-off-the-land intruders move laterally after stealing valid credentials.
  • Stage immutable, offline configuration backups: Maintain gold-standard, offline copies of PLC logic, microgrid setpoints, switch configs, and access control databases so facility teams can bare-metal restore controllers without paying ransom or awaiting vendor field engineers.
  • Architect for local islanded survivorship: Ensure IP cameras continue recording to local edge NVRs and badge readers continue validating cached credentials at facility doors even if the base core network is severed.
  • Mandate FIPS 140-3 validated encryption: NIST moved all FIPS 140-2 certificates to its Historical List on September 21, 2026. All new procurements for CUI-handling switches, firewalls, cameras, and storage must specify FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic modules.

Paragon Micro's Public Sector Zero Trust and Cyber Resilience practice helps installation and program teams architect network microsegmentation, phishing-resistant multifactor authentication with continuous device-trust validation, and immutable backup, failover, and disaster-recovery infrastructure.

Chapter 4

Drones: detection is a sensor and network problem

Unmanned incursions over domestic bases

420

Approximate unauthorized drone sightings over DoW installations from September 2024 to September 2025—up 82% from 230 the prior year

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commander Gen. Gregory Guillot reported that domestic military installations now experience an average of 1 to 2 unauthorized drone incursions every day.

These incidents are no longer isolated hobbyist flights. Between March 9 and March 15, 2026, security forces at Barksdale Air Force Base tracked multiple coordinated waves of 12 to 15 drones maneuvering over sensitive areas, including the flight line. Testifying before the Senate on March 19, 2026, Gen. Guillot noted that U.S. forces now successfully defeat roughly a quarter of the drones detected over installations—up from nearly zero a year prior, but underscoring the urgent need for integrated base defense.

Statutory authorities and the rise of JIATF-401

Defending a domestic installation against unmanned systems is governed by strict legal authorities as well as physics. In February 2025, Gen. Guillot informed lawmakers that only about half of U.S. military installations were designated as "covered facilities" authorized to conduct active counter-drone mitigation under 10 U.S.C. § 130i. Enacted on December 18, 2025, the FY2026 NDAA codified Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401) into law, amended Section 130i to mandate annual public congressional reporting on base incursions, and included the SAFER SKIES Act—opening a statutory pathway for trained federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to exercise counter-drone authorities around sensitive facilities.

Because domestic bases sit adjacent to civilian neighborhoods and commercial airspace, positive identification and low-collateral mitigation are mandatory. As NORTHCOM deputy test director Jason Mayes observed during the Falcon Peak counter-UAS exercise: "We can't just shoot anything down just because it's over our installation."

Established on August 28, 2025 with authority to approve up to $50 million per rapid initiative, JIATF-401 selected five installations in May 2026—Fort Huachuca, Fort Bliss, Naval Base Kitsap, Grand Forks Air Force Base, and Whiteman Air Force Base—to pilot directed-energy counter-drone systems, including high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves. As JIATF-401 Director Brig. Gen. Matt Ross emphasized, "there is no 'silver bullet' to address this challenge"—requiring bases to layer kinetic, electronic, and directed-energy effectors atop a unified sensor network.

The five-stage installation C-UAS data pipeline

Whether an installation is defending a domestic flight line under FORTRESS America or an expeditionary brigade perimeter under Project Flytrap, counter-UAS effectiveness depends on how fast the underlying IT network moves and fuses sensor data:

  1. Detect

    Passive radio-frequency (RF) receivers, 3D tactical radars, acoustic arrays, and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras spot low-radar-cross-section drones across complementary spectrums.

  2. Track

    Forward edge compute nodes fuse disparate sensor feeds via open standards (such as the Integrated Sensor Architecture) into a single, deduplicated track across altitude and heading changes.

  3. Identify

    Operators correlate the fused track against high-definition PTZ thermal/optical video and authorized flight schedules to classify threat intent and payload risk.

  4. Decide & Mitigate

    Watch commanders execute authorized response options under 10 U.S.C. § 130i—cueing electronic disruption, directed energy, or kinetic interceptors without blinding base communications.

  5. Record & Report

    High-resolution sensor tracks, RF captures, video streams, and operator actions are archived to tamper-evident storage for intelligence exploitation, law enforcement prosecution, and mandatory Section 130i reporting.

What to specify for base C-UAS and physical security infrastructure

  • Eliminate "swivel-chair" vendor silos: Require all perimeter radars, RF detectors, acoustic sensors, and PTZ cameras to publish into a single open-architecture Common Operating Picture (COP) and unified event log rather than forcing security forces to monitor six separate vendor screens.
  • Deploy ruggedized edge compute at the sensor tower: Process video analytics, optical target tracking, and multi-sensor track fusion on rugged GPU edge nodes close to the perimeter so tracking survives even if a backhaul fiber trunk is cut.
  • Put perimeter sensors and NVRs on backed-up power and cooling: Size tower UPS banks, PoE switches, and recording servers to match the installation's 14-day microgrid endurance target.
  • Size high-throughput storage for evidentiary retention: Calculate continuous 4K EO/IR video and radar track retention requirements to satisfy post-incident federal investigations and annual Section 130i reporting.
  • Enforce FAR 52.204-25 (Section 889) across all optical and RF sub-assemblies: Verify that no perimeter cameras, thermal imaging modules, or network switches contain covered components from Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE, or Hytera.
  • Enforce FAR 52.240-1 (ASDA) on base security drones: Confirm that any blue-force perimeter patrol or interceptor drones operated by the installation comply fully with American Security Drone Act restrictions.

Read Paragon Micro's technical analysis, Edge AI in the Battlefield for Counter-UAS Operations, along with our Project Flytrap report, to see how edge AI and open data standards turn raw sensor feeds into actionable tracks. Our Public Sector Video Surveillance and Physical Security team designs and stages NDAA-compliant camera architectures, physical access control systems, and fault-tolerant storage built to stay online through grid outages.

Chapter 5

Supply chain: chips, magnets, and the parts inside base systems

Pillar 2 of FORTRESS America links installation survivability directly to domestic industrial manufacturing. In July 2025, the Pentagon agreed to purchase $400 million of preferred stock in MP Materials—positioning the department as the company's largest shareholder—while establishing a 10-year price floor of $110 per kilogram for neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) products. Once MP Materials commissions its planned "10X" manufacturing facility starting in 2028, total U.S. rare-earth magnet production capacity is projected to reach roughly 10,000 metric tons annually.

Navigating the January 1, 2027 DFARS magnet rule vs. IT hardware

DFARS 252.225-7052 restricts the acquisition of samarium-cobalt magnets, neodymium-iron-boron magnets, tantalum, and tungsten originating from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Effective January 1, 2027, the statutory restriction expands upstream to prohibit covered materials mined, refined, separated, melted, or produced in those four countries—not merely final magnet sintering.

How the exceptions work for installation IT: The DFARS clause explicitly exempts electronic devices (unless a specific solicitation overrides that exception) as well as commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) items—with COTS items losing their exemption on January 1, 2027 only if they contain 50% or more covered material by weight. Standard data center servers, network switches, and security cameras typically qualify under the electronic-device and COTS exceptions, whereas actuators, gimbal motors, HVAC blowers, and drone propulsion assemblies require strict upstream provenance verification. (With defense industry associations actively petitioning for transitional waivers as of mid-2026, contracting teams should verify current DFARS class deviations prior to award.)

While the magnet rule exempts most standard electronics, the upcoming federal semiconductor ban hits installation IT directly. Section 5949 of the FY2023 NDAA prohibits executive agencies from procuring any electronic products or services that contain covered semiconductors designed or produced by SMIC, YMTC, or CXMT, taking effect on December 23, 2027. Under the FAR Council's February 2026 proposed rule, contractors must conduct a reasonable inquiry, certify compliance, and flow the restriction down to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT hardware, cameras, controllers, and sub-tier components.

AS9120-certified chain of custody

Paragon Micro's Public Sector division protects installation procurements against counterfeit parts and unauthorized component substitutions by sourcing exclusively through authorized OEM channels, logging every serialized system and firmware step, enforcing Trade Agreements Act (TAA) compliance, and restricting physical handling inside our System Readiness Center to vetted U.S. citizens. In June 2026, Paragon Micro achieved AS9120 certification for aerospace and defense distribution—providing auditable lot traceability and counterfeit-prevention controls.

Building a strategic reserve for installation IT

Pillar 3 of FORTRESS America mandates deeper on-base reserves of munitions, fuel, medicine, and blood so installations cannot be "starved out, shut down, or cut off." Installation CIOs and civil engineers should apply that exact same reserve doctrine to mission-critical IT and OT hardware. A base engineered to operate for 14+ days off the civilian grid during a crisis cannot wait six weeks for an overseas RMA replacement when a core switch power supply, microgrid PLC, or NVR storage array fails. Paragon Micro's 55,000+ square-foot System Readiness Center provides secure, climate-controlled staging and bonded storage for pre-imaged spare drives, power supplies, switches, and tactical radios—ready to drop into production racks on zero notice.

Five supply-chain questions to ask every installation hardware supplier

  • Do any memory modules, controllers, or sub-assemblies in this bill of materials contain semiconductors from SMIC, YMTC, or CXMT, and how are you certifying compliance ahead of the December 23, 2027 Section 5949 deadline?
  • Does this order include motors, actuators, or non-exempt assemblies subject to the January 1, 2027 DFARS 252.225-7052 rare-earth magnet mining and refining restrictions?
  • Are all physical security cameras, thermal sensors, and network switches certified free of covered components under FAR 52.204-25 (Section 889)?
  • Is the complete hardware kit Trade Agreements Act (TAA) compliant, and can you provide an AS9120-backed chain-of-custody log from intake to base delivery?
  • Can your facility pre-image, burn-in test, and warehouse bonded, ready-to-install spares for our critical base systems?

Chapter 6

How to buy it, readiness checklists, and common questions

Pre-competed contract vehicles available through Paragon Micro

U.S. Army & Federal

Army ITES-4H

Eligible buyersU.S. Army, Department of War, and all federal agencies

Ordering periodActive through 2035

ScopeServers, base data center infrastructure, storage, rugged endpoints, networking, UPS power, and lifecycle services

Missile Defense Agency

MDA SHIELD IDIQ

Contract numberHQ0859-26-D-E455

Ordering periodDecember 28, 2025 to December 28, 2035

ScopeIT infrastructure, hardware, base & weapon-system integration, and lifecycle support under a $151B shared ceiling

Governmentwide

NASA SEWP V

Contract numberNNG15SD91B

Ordering periodExtended by NASA through January 31, 2027

ScopeFull-spectrum commercial IT hardware, physical security systems, networking, and product-based integration services

Governmentwide

GSA MAS Products

Eligible buyersAll federal and defense installations

Contract pathwayParticipating dealer and teaming arrangements via EC America (GS-35F-0511T) and TD SYNNEX (GS-35F-0563U)

Paragon Micro is a Dell Technologies Federal Platinum Partner alongside broad multi-OEM authorizations covering enterprise and rugged compute, UPS and power distribution, Zero Trust networking, physical security cameras, and counter-drone edge infrastructure. Engage our Public Sector division early to match your installation bill of materials to the optimal contract vehicle.

Role-based readiness checklists

Checklist 01

For Federal System Integrators (FSIs)

  • Align IT specs with base microgrid engineering early: Bring your hardware integration partner into energy-resilience and UFC 4-010-06 control-system design reviews upfront so rack power draw, double-conversion UPS sizing, and HVAC thermal loads match the installation's backup circuits.
  • Engineer to UFC 4-010-06 RMF baselines: Apply Facility-Related Control Systems cybersecurity controls to every subsystem touching microgrid switchgear, building automation, IP cameras, or physical access control.
  • Qualify dual-OEM baselines and pre-stage spares: Mitigate lead-time and Section 5949 supply-chain risk by qualifying secondary OEM sources and staging golden-imaged spares inside an AS9120-certified facility.

Checklist 02

For Advanced Projects Teams

  • Verify physically segmented build cages: Confirm where your sensitive installation racks are integrated, verify U.S.-citizen-only handling, and require access-controlled build zones isolated from commercial traffic.
  • Require serialized custody manifests: Demand end-to-end chain-of-custody logs at every handoff and tamper-evident transport packaging.
  • Design for 100% islanded operation: Architect sensitive compounds to run on local power generation, local NVR video retention, and local cached badge authentication when external base fiber and utility feeds are severed.

Checklist 03

For Installation Commanders, CIOs, and Contracting Offices

  • Verify that every mission-critical IT load—including server room CRAC/HVAC cooling and wiring closet switches—is wired to emergency backup power circuits.
  • Instrument and test data center, communications, and physical security systems during the installation's next live Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise (ERRE).
  • Enforce UFC 4-010-06 RMF cybersecurity requirements across all cameras, badge readers, HVAC controls, and microgrid controllers.
  • Segment OT/FRCS networks from enterprise business IT and monitor east-west traffic inside control enclaves for Volt Typhoon-style lateral movement.
  • Unify counter-UAS radar, RF, acoustic, and optical sensors into a single Common Operating Picture (COP) and evidentiary archive sized for 10 U.S.C. § 130i reporting.
  • Mandate FIPS 140-3 validated encryption modules across all new CUI switches, radios, servers, and storage arrays following the September 21, 2026 FIPS 140-2 cutoff.
  • Obtain written FAR 52.204-25 (Section 889), FAR 52.240-1 (ASDA), and TAA certifications, plus a December 2027 Section 5949 semiconductor compliance roadmap.
  • Review DFARS 252.225-7052 magnet clauses carefully when procuring non-exempt motors, actuators, or base security drones after January 1, 2027.
  • Stage pre-configured, golden-imaged spare drives, power supplies, switches, and radios on base or in bonded partner storage.
  • Verify the supplier's active SPRS score, annual CMMC Phase 1 Level 2 self-assessment affirmation, and NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 compliance (following the July 13, 2026 suspension of CMMC Phase 2 third-party mandates).

Frequently asked questions

What is FORTRESS America and what are its five pillars?

Announced on September 30, 2026 by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at Marine Corps Base Quantico and established by formal memorandum the same day, FORTRESS America (Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy, Supply and Survivability) is a Department of War program organized around five pillars: (1) installation energy independence, (2) supply-chain and defense industrial base resilience, (3) a strategic defense reserve, (4) installation hardening and cyber resilience against cyberattacks, sabotage, and drones, and (5) resilience in space and spectrum.

What did MIT Lincoln Laboratory's grid-cut exercises reveal about base IT systems?

Across 33 Energy Resilience Readiness Exercises (ERREs) where installations physically disconnected from the commercial utility grid, assessors found four recurring vulnerabilities: aged UPS batteries that drained prematurely, unserviced or unrefueled backup generators, server room air conditioning left off emergency backup circuits (causing equipment to overheat), and communications closets that dropped offline for lack of battery support.

How does UFC 4-010-06 apply to installation cameras, access control, and microgrids?

Unified Facilities Criteria UFC 4-010-06 (Cybersecurity of Facility-Related Control Systems) classifies utility control systems (including microgrid controllers), electronic security systems (IP cameras and intrusion sensors), building control systems (HVAC), and fire/life safety systems as regulated control systems subject to the Risk Management Framework (RMF), network segmentation, and graceful local failover requirements.

How does the January 1, 2027 DFARS 252.225-7052 magnet rule differ from the December 23, 2027 Section 5949 semiconductor rule for IT hardware?

Starting January 1, 2027, DFARS 252.225-7052 expands restrictions on covered rare-earth magnets, tantalum, and tungsten to include upstream mining and refining in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, but explicitly exempts electronic devices (unless overridden by contract) and COTS items under 50% covered weight—meaning standard servers and switches are typically exempt while motors and drone components are affected. By contrast, NDAA Section 5949 (effective December 23, 2027) bars executive agencies from procuring electronic products containing covered semiconductors from SMIC, YMTC, or CXMT, reaching directly into COTS IT hardware.

What is the current status of CMMC requirements for installation IT and CUI contracts?

On July 13, 2026, the Department of War suspended the November 10, 2026 rollout of CMMC Phase 2 (mandatory third-party C3PAO assessments) while its CMMC Reform Task Force reviews the program. However, CMMC Phase 1 remains mandatory: contractors handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) must maintain current SPRS scores, complete Level 2 self-assessments with annual senior-official affirmations, and comply fully with NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 and DFARS 252.204-7012.

How does Paragon Micro’s Public Sector division support FORTRESS America installation requirements?

Paragon Micro, through its Public Sector division and AS9120-certified System Readiness Center, helps installation contracting offices and Federal System Integrators specify, source, pre-image, burn-in test, and stage servers, double-conversion UPS power, Zero Trust microsegmented networks, NDAA-compliant physical security systems, and bonded spare reserves through Army ITES-4H, MDA SHIELD IDIQ, NASA SEWP V, and GSA MAS.

Timeline

Key dates through 2028

  1. Oct 30, 2026

    30-day deadline for USW(A&S) to stand up the FORTRESS America Program Office core cell

    September 30, 2026 establishing memo

  2. Nov 10, 2026

    Original CMMC Phase 2 date (suspended July 13, 2026; Phase 1 Level 2 self-assessments remain mandatory)

    Awaiting CMMC Reform Task Force guidance

  3. Jan 1, 2027

    DFARS 252.225-7052 rare-earth magnet rule extends upstream to mining and refining

    Electronic device & COTS exceptions apply

  4. Jan 31, 2027

    Current NASA SEWP V ordering extension concludes

    Contract NNG15SD91B

  5. Sep 30, 2027

    Department of War Target-Level Zero Trust deadline across IT and OT

    Covers 91 capability outcomes

  6. Dec 23, 2027

    NDAA Section 5949 semiconductor prohibition takes effect

    Bars SMIC, YMTC, and CXMT chips

  7. 2028

    MP Materials 10X domestic rare-earth magnet facility begins commissioning

    Targets 10,000 metric tons annual capacity

  8. Sep 30, 2028

    Deadline to begin operating an Army-regulated nuclear reactor at a domestic base

    Executive Order 14299 mandate

FORTRESS America will ultimately be tested on the day an installation loses its commercial utility feed, an OT microgrid controller is probed by pre-positioned cyber actors, or waves of unauthorized drones cross the perimeter fence line. Keeping the mission online depends on IT infrastructure backed by complete power and cooling circuits, segmented control networks that hold under attack, multi-sensor C-UAS pipelines that fuse tracks onto a single screen, and verified hardware supply chains backed by pre-staged spares.

Paragon Micro · Public Sector Division

Preparing installation IT and security for FORTRESS America?

Tell us what your installation needs to stay online under any condition. Paragon Micro's Public Sector division helps Department of War installation offices and Federal System Integrators specify, source, stage, and deliver servers, backup power, Zero Trust control networks, and counter-UAS security infrastructure through ITES-4H, MDA SHIELD, NASA SEWP V, and GSA.

Contact Paragon Micro

Related reading

Research library Sources and chapter annotations (39 references) Expand to view all APA 7th edition references annotated by the article chapters they support

Research reviewed October 31, 2026 by Paragon Micro (Public Sector Division). All in-text parenthetical citations have been consolidated into this expandable reference library and mapped to the exact chapters and timelines they support.

  1. Cited in Chapter 5 · DFARS 252.225-7052 Magnet Rule Industry Transition

    Adamas Intelligence. (2026, June 5). U.S. defense contractors seek second DFARS delay as Pentagon's $200B 'Deal Team Six' mobilizes for rare earth independence. https://www.adamasintel.com/u-s-defense-contractors-seek-second-dfars-delay-as-pentagons-200b-deal-team-six-mobilizes-for-rare-earth-independence/

    Supports the Chapter 5 analysis regarding defense contractor waiver petitions ahead of the January 1, 2027 DFARS rare-earth magnet mining and refining restrictions.

  2. Cited in Chapters 1 & 4 · Establishment of JIATF-401 & $50M Initiative Authority

    Altman, H. (2025, August 29). New Pentagon task force aims to accelerate drone defense at home and abroad. The War Zone. https://www.twz.com/air/new-pentagon-task-force-aims-to-accelerate-drone-defense-at-home-and-abroad

    Supports the August 28, 2025 establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401) in Chapter 1 and its authority to approve up to $50 million per counter-drone initiative in Chapter 4.

  3. Cited in Chapters 1 & 4 · Barksdale AFB Swarm Incursions & Defeat Rates

    Altman, H. (2026, March 24). U.S. battled drone incursions over key bases at home after launch of Epic Fury. The War Zone. https://www.twz.com/news-features/u-s-battled-drone-incursions-over-key-bases-at-home-after-launch-of-epic-fury

    Supports the March 9–15, 2026 incursions by waves of 12 to 15 drones over Barksdale Air Force Base and Gen. Gregory Guillot's March 19, 2026 Senate testimony on drone defeat rates in Chapters 1 and 4.

  4. Cited in Chapter 1 · Onsite Power & Supply Chain Commitments

    Arora, K. (2026, October 1). What is FORTRESS America? US plan to keep military bases running through cyberattacks and sabotage. The Statesman. https://thestatesman.com/world/what-is-fortress-america-us-plan-to-keep-military-bases-running-through-cyberattacks-and-sabotage-1503645382.html

    Supports Secretary Hegseth's direct quotations committing every major military installation to generate its own power and repatriate critical supply chains in Chapter 1.

  5. Cited in Chapter 3 & Timeline · Target-Level Zero Trust for OT & SCADA

    Easley, M. (2024, April 4). With 2027 deadline looming, DOD moves into implementation phase of zero trust transformation. DefenseScoop. https://defensescoop.com/2024/04/04/dod-zero-trust-implementations-phase-2027/

    Supports the September 30, 2027 Target-Level Zero Trust deadline and DoD CIO commentary on extending Zero Trust to operational technology (OT) and SCADA systems in Chapter 3 and the Timeline.

  6. Cited in Intro, Chapters 1 & 5 · FORTRESS America Pillars, Reserves & Next Great American Base

    Edwards, J. (2026, October 1). Hegseth unveils Project Meridian & 5 other DOW initiatives. GovCon Wire. https://www.govconwire.com/articles/hegseth-project-meridian-dow-initiatives

    Supports the September 30, 2026 Quantico announcement of FORTRESS America alongside Project Meridian and AutoWarCom in the Intro, the Next Great American Base in Chapter 1, and strategic reserves in Chapters 1 and 5.

  7. Cited in Chapter 6 & Timeline · CMMC Phase 2 Suspension & Phase 1 Enforcement

    U.S. Department of War. (2026, July 13). Forging the arsenal of freedom: Department of War suspends CMMC Phase II requirements [Press release]. https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4542329/forging-the-arsenal-of-freedom-department-of-war-suspends-cmmc-phase-ii-require/

    Supports the July 13, 2026 suspension of the November 10, 2026 CMMC Phase 2 third-party assessment transition, the creation of the CMMC Reform Task Force, and the continued enforcement of Phase 1 self-assessments and NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 in Chapter 6 and the Timeline.

  8. Cited in Hero Stats, Chapters 1, 2 & Timeline · Executive Order 14299 & Army Reactor Deadline

    Fork, W. E., & Hammond, M. C. (2025, October 21). Implementation of Executive Order 14299 turns advanced nuclear deployment into a U.S. Army priority. Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP. https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/executive-order-advanced-nuclear-deployment-us-army.html

    Supports the September 30, 2028 deadline under Executive Order 14299 to operate an Army-regulated nuclear reactor at a domestic installation in the Hero stats, Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and the Timeline.

  9. Cited in Hero Stats, Key Takeaways & Chapter 2 · MIT Lincoln Lab Grid-Cut Exercises (ERREs)

    Foy, K. (2025, September 22). Power-outage exercises strengthen the resilience of US bases. MIT News. https://news.mit.edu/2025/power-outage-exercises-strengthen-resilience-us-bases-0922

    Supports the 33-installation Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise (ERRE) findings—failed UPS batteries, unserviced generators, server room HVAC left off backup circuits, and dropped comms—plus the 2032 congressional mandate in the Hero stats, Key Takeaways, and Chapter 2.

  10. Cited in Chapter 1 · Air Force Microreactors & Next Great American Base

    Gordon, C., & Hadley, G. (2026, September 30). Hegseth unveils new Autonomous Warfare Command in 'State of the Force' address. Air & Space Forces Magazine. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/hegseth-drones-autonomous-warfare-command-state-of-the-force/

    Supports Air Force microreactor plans at Eielson AFB, solar/geothermal microgrids, and the 15,000-to-25,000 troop sizing for the Next Great American Base in Chapter 1.

  11. Cited in Hero Stats, Key Takeaways, Chapters 1 & 3 · Volt Typhoon OT & Camera Pre-Positioning

    Greig, J. (2024, February 7). CISA, FBI warn of China-linked hackers pre-positioning for 'destructive cyberattacks against US critical infrastructure.' The Record. https://therecord.media/cisa-fbi-warn-of-china-linked-hackers-targeting-critical-us-infrastructure

    Supports the February 7, 2024 CISA/NSA/FBI advisory documenting Volt Typhoon's 5+ year dwell time in victim IT networks, lateral movement to OT, and access to facility camera systems in the Hero stats, Key Takeaways, Chapter 1, and Chapter 3.

  12. Cited in Chapters 1 & 4 · NORTHCOM 2024 Incursions & 10 U.S.C. 130i Coverage

    Harper, J. (2025, February 13). NORAD commander says hundreds of drone incursions were detected at US military installations. DefenseScoop. https://defensescoop.com/2025/02/13/drone-incursions-us-military-bases-norad-northcom-counter-small-uas/

    Supports Gen. Gregory Guillot's February 2025 testimony reporting 350 drone detections across 100 installations in 2024 and noting that only about half of installations were covered under 10 U.S.C. § 130i in Chapters 1 and 4.

  13. Cited in Chapters 1 & 2 · U.S. Army & DOE Janus Commercial Microreactor Program

    Hauptman, M. (2025, October 14). New program aims to put nuclear generators on Army bases. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/10/14/new-program-aims-to-put-nuclear-generators-on-army-bases/

    Supports the October 14, 2025 launch of the Army, DOE, and DIU Janus program for commercially owned microreactors on Army bases in Chapters 1 and 2.

  14. Cited in Intro, Key Takeaways, Chapter 1 & Timeline · Establishing Memorandum

    Hegseth, P. (2026, September 30). Establishment of FORTRESS America as a Department of War program for the defense of the American homeland [Memorandum]. U.S. Department of War. https://www.paragonmicro.us/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Fortress-America.jpg

    Primary source directive supporting the five FORTRESS America pillars, the 30-day Program Office stand-up deadline (October 30, 2026), SES/two-star leadership structure, and direct quotations in the Intro, Key Takeaways, Chapter 1, and Timeline.

  15. Cited in Chapters 1 & 4 · SAFER SKIES Act Interagency Counter-Drone Authority

    Kesteloo, H. (2026, September 10). 1,500 US agencies are about to get counter-drone powers. DroneXL. https://dronexl.co/2026/09/10/1500-us-agencies-counter-drone-powers/

    Supports the SAFER SKIES Act provisions in the FY2026 NDAA expanding counter-drone authority pathways to trained federal, state, and local agencies in Chapters 1 and 4.

  16. Cited in Hero Stats, Key Takeaways & Chapter 4 · 420 Base Drone Sightings (+82%) & Falcon Peak

    Marrow, M. (2025, October). With daily drone incursions over bases, NORTHCOM takes aim through Falcon Peak. Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/drone-incursions-us-military-falcon-peak-2025-cuas/

    Supports the 82% surge to roughly 420 drone sightings over DoW installations (1 to 2 per day) and NORTHCOM deputy test director Jason Mayes' commentary at the Falcon Peak exercise in the Hero stats, Key Takeaways, and Chapter 4.

  17. Cited in Chapters 1 & 4 · FY2026 NDAA Section 130i Amendments & Reporting

    McNabb, M. (2025, December 9). NDAA FY 2026: Key counter-UAS provisions explained. DroneLife. https://dronelife.com/2025/12/09/ndaa-fy-2026-key-counter-uas-provisions-explained/

    Supports the December 18, 2025 FY2026 NDAA codification of JIATF-401 and the 10 U.S.C. § 130i amendments adding annual public reporting requirements in Chapters 1 and 4.

  18. Cited in Chapters 1, 5 & Timeline · Pentagon–MP Materials Rare Earth Magnet Partnership

    MP Materials. (2025, July 10). MP Materials announces transformational public-private partnership with the Department of Defense to accelerate U.S. rare earth magnet independence [Press release]. https://mpmaterials.com/news/mp-materials-announces-transformational-public-private-partnership-with-the-department-of-defense-to-accelerate-u-s-rare-earth-magnet-independence/

    Supports the July 10, 2025 $400 million preferred stock agreement, the 10-year $110/kg NdPr price floor, and the 10,000-metric-ton 10X magnet facility commissioning in 2028 in Chapters 1, 5, and the Timeline.

  19. Cited in Chapter 6 & Timeline · NASA SEWP V Extension

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (n.d.). Solutions for Enterprise-Wide Procurement (SEWP). Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.sewp.nasa.gov/

    Supports the NASA SEWP V ordering extension through January 31, 2027 in Chapter 6 and the Timeline.

  20. Cited in Chapters 3 & 6 · FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Transition

    National Institute of Standards and Technology. (n.d.). Cryptographic Module Validation Program. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program

    Supports the September 21, 2026 transition of FIPS 140-2 certificates to NIST's Historical List and the requirement for FIPS 140-3 validated modules in Chapters 3 and 6.

  21. Cited in Chapter 6 · GSA MAS Contract Pathways

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-a). GSA. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/contracts/gsa/

    Supports GSA MAS ordering pathways via EC America (GS-35F-0511T) and TD SYNNEX (GS-35F-0563U) in Chapter 6.

  22. Cited in Chapter 6 · U.S. Army ITES-4H Contract Vehicle

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-b). ITES-4H. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/contracts/ites-4h/

    Supports U.S. Army and federal agency hardware ordering through 2035 under Army ITES-4H in Chapter 6.

  23. Cited in Chapter 6 · MDA SHIELD IDIQ Contract Vehicle

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-c). MDA SHIELD IDIQ. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/contracts/mda-shield-idiq/

    Supports Missile Defense Agency SHIELD IDIQ (HQ0859-26-D-E455) ordering through December 28, 2035 under the $151B ceiling in Chapter 6.

  24. Cited in Chapter 6 · NASA SEWP V Contract Scope

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-d). NASA SEWP V. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/contracts/nasa-sewpv/

    Supports Paragon Micro's NASA SEWP V contract (NNG15SD91B) scope in Chapter 6.

  25. Cited in Chapters 2 & 5 · System Readiness Center & Strategic IT Spares

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-e). Secure integration & staging facility. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/about-us/facility/

    Supports Paragon Micro's System Readiness Center rack integration, TAA verification, U.S.-citizen chain of custody, and bonded spare storage in Chapters 2 and 5.

  26. Cited in Chapter 2 · Tactical & Remote Site Power Platforms

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-f). Tactical & rugged equipment. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/solutions/tactical-and-rugged-equipment/

    Supports Paragon Micro's solar, generator, vehicle power, and lithium-ion battery platform capabilities for remote and tactical sites in Chapter 2.

  27. Cited in Chapter 4 · Video Surveillance & Physical Security Architectures

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-g). Video surveillance & physical security solutions. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/solutions/video-surveillance-and-physical-security/

    Supports Paragon Micro's camera and sensor architectures, physical access control, and redundant storage systems in Chapter 4.

  28. Cited in Chapter 3 · Zero Trust & Microsegmentation

    Paragon Micro. (n.d.-h). Zero trust & cyber resilience for government. Retrieved October 2, 2026, from https://www.paragonmicro.us/solutions/zero-trust-and-cyber-resilience/

    Supports Paragon Micro's microsegmentation, multifactor authentication with device trust validation, and disaster-recovery capabilities in Chapter 3.

  29. Cited in Chapter 4 · Edge AI for Counter-UAS Sensor Fusion

    Paragon Micro. (2026a, February 24). Edge AI in the battlefield for counter-UAS operations. https://www.paragonmicro.us/edge-ai-in-the-battlefield-for-counter-uas-operations/

    Supports the discussion of edge AI processing raw C-UAS sensor streams into actionable operator tracks in Chapter 4.

  30. Cited in Chapter 5 · AS9120 Aerospace & Defense Certification

    Paragon Micro. (2026b, June 30). Paragon Micro achieves AS9120 certification for aerospace and defense distribution. https://www.paragonmicro.us/paragon-micro-achieves-as9120-certification-for-aerospace-defense-distribution/

    Supports Paragon Micro's June 2026 AS9120 certification for aerospace and defense distribution traceability in Chapter 5.

  31. Cited in Intro & Chapter 1 · Program Staffing & Space/Spectrum Pillar

    Parry, H., & Stevenson, S. (2026, September 30). Hegseth unveils 6 major US military changes in 'State of the Force' address. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/hegseth-unveils-6-major-us-military-changes-12509906

    Supports reporting on FORTRESS America's budget/staffing development in the Intro and Pillar 5 (satellite and communications resilience) in Chapter 1.

  32. Cited in Chapters 4, 5 & 6 · NDAA Section 889 Camera & Telecom Ban

    Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment, 48 C.F.R. § 52.204-25 (2021). https://www.acquisition.gov/far/52.204-25

    Supports the FAR 52.204-25 prohibition on Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE, and Hytera video surveillance and telecom equipment in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

  33. Cited in Chapters 4 & 6 · American Security Drone Act Prohibition

    Prohibition on Unmanned Aircraft Systems Manufactured or Assembled by American Security Drone Act-Covered Foreign Entities, 48 C.F.R. § 52.240-1 (2024). https://www.acquisition.gov/far/52.240-1

    Supports the FAR 52.240-1 ban on procuring or operating covered foreign drones on installations in Chapters 4 and 6.

  34. Cited in Key Takeaways, Chapter 5 & Timeline · January 1, 2027 Rare Earth Magnet Rule

    Restriction on the Acquisition of Certain Magnets, Tantalum, and Tungsten, 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7052 (2024). https://www.acquisition.gov/dfars/252.225-7052-restriction-acquisition-certain-magnets-tantalum-and-tungsten

    Supports the January 1, 2027 expansion of DFARS 252.225-7052 to mining and refining, as well as the electronic-device and COTS exceptions, in Key Takeaways, Chapter 5, and the Timeline.

  35. Cited in Chapters 1 & 4 · JIATF-401 Five-Base Directed Energy C-UAS Pilot

    Stassis, C. (2026, May 11). 5 US bases selected for anti-drone pilot program. Military Times. https://www.militarytimes.com/industry/techwatch/2026/05/11/5-us-bases-selected-for-anti-drone-pilot-program/

    Supports the May 6, 2026 selection of five bases (Fort Huachuca, Fort Bliss, Naval Base Kitsap, Grand Forks AFB, and Whiteman AFB) for high-energy laser and high-power microwave C-UAS pilots and Brig. Gen. Matt Ross's commentary in Chapters 1 and 4.

  36. Cited in Chapter 2 · U.S. Army Microgrid Definition & 14-Day Endurance

    Surash, J. E. J., & Hughes, R. (2022, April 12). Developing microgrids to deliver energy resilience. U.S. Army. https://www.army.mil/article/255597/developing_microgrids_to_deliver_energy_resilience

    Supports the U.S. Army definition of an installation microgrid and the 14-day islanded endurance design at JFTB Los Alamitos in Chapter 2.

  37. Cited in Key Takeaways, Chapters 3 & 6 · UFC 4-010-06 Control Systems Cybersecurity

    U.S. Department of Defense. (2023). Cybersecurity of facility-related control systems (UFC 4-010-06). https://www.wbdg.org/FFC/DOD/UFC/ufc_4_010_06_2023.pdf

    Supports the classification of building, utility/microgrid, electronic security (cameras/access control), and fire/life safety systems as Facility-Related Control Systems (FRCS) under the Risk Management Framework in Key Takeaways, Chapter 3, and Chapter 6.

  38. Cited in Key Takeaways, Chapters 5, 6 & Timeline · NDAA Section 5949 Semiconductor Prohibition

    Wagner, M., Cassidy, S. B., Burnette, R., & Cho, E. (2026, February 26). FAR Council issues notice of proposed rulemaking to implement prohibition on acquisition of certain semiconductors. Inside Government Contracts. https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2026/02/far-council-issues-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-to-implement-prohibition-on-acquisition-of-certain-semiconductors/

    Supports the December 23, 2027 effective date for NDAA Section 5949 (barring SMIC, YMTC, and CXMT chips across COTS IT hardware) in Key Takeaways, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and the Timeline.

  39. Cited in Chapters 1 & 2 · Executive Order on Base Coal Power Purchase Agreements

    The White House. (2026, February 11). Strengthening United States national defense with America's beautiful clean coal power generation fleet [Executive order]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/02/strengthening-united-states-national-defense-with-americas-beautiful-clean-coal-power-generation-fleet

    Supports the February 11, 2026 executive order directing long-term coal power purchase agreements for military installations in Chapters 1 and 2.

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